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 This case is presented for instructional purposes only. The ideas and opinions expressed 
are the authors ’  own. The case is not meant to reﬂ ect the ofﬁ cial position ,  views ,  or 
policies of the editors ,  the editors ’  host institutions ,  or the  authors ’  host institutions . 
6.5.1  Background 
 Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is an increasingly serious threat to  global public 
health . First described in 1961, methicillin-resistant  Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) 
is one of the best known antimicrobial resistant (AMR) pathogens. It has become an 
increasingly serious cause of  health care associated infections worldwide (Boyce 
et al.  2005 ). People infected with MRSA, which resists standard beta-lactam  antibi-
otics , can present symptoms or be asymptomatic carriers. 
 In a community setting, most MRSA carriers have few or relatively minor symp-
toms. In hospitals, however, open wounds, invasive devices, and weakened immune 
systems pose a greater risk of infection, making MRSA a serious health problem. 
The presence of Panton-Valentine leukocidin (PVL) cytotoxin in a  Staphylococcus 
aureus has the potential to cause more severe infections, such as pneumonia and 
skin infections, although these are rare events considering the number of asymp-
tomatic carriers (Gorwitz  2008 ). 
 Worldwide, prevalence of MRSA among the general public and in hospitals var-
ies widely, as do the strategies used to control hospital-acquired MRSA (Boyce 
et al.  2005 ). In the  Netherlands and  Scandinavia , for example, MRSA causes less 
than 1 % of all cases of  Staphylococcus aureus bacteraemia. This percentage con-
trasts with percentages of up to 50 % in other European countries (Wertheim et al. 
 2004 ). To maintain this low incidence, hospitals in the Netherlands and Scandinavia 
follow a strict AMR related search and destroy  policy . This policy consists of active 
screening of patients and staff for MRSA, strict  enforcement of contact precautions, 
and judicious use of broad-spectrum  antibiotics (Boyce et al.  2005 ). 
 In the Netherlands, the  Working Party on Infection Prevention (WIP) has incorpo-
rated this search and destroy policy into national MRSA  guideline s. The WIP, funded 
by the Dutch Ministry of Health, was founded 25 years ago by respective  profession al 
societies of physicians, hygienists, and microbiologists. WIP-issued guidelines are pro-
fessional standards most health professionals and institutes follow (Boyce et al.  2005 ). 
 The 2012 WIP guidelines for MRSA  prevention in hospital settings involve three 
principal procedures, which address both symptomatic and asymptomatic patients, 
since carriers can also transmit the infection. First, patients with MRSA are isolated 
in single rooms and treated to eradicate MRSA. Isolation procedures require those 
entering the patient’s room to wear a gown and mask. Second, hospital patients at 
increased risk of being carriers are also placed in isolation until proven MRSA free. 
Patients considered potential carriers include all patients (a) transferred from hospi-
tals abroad to Dutch hospitals, (b) transferred from Dutch hospitals with an existing 
MRSA condition, and (c) placed in the same room as a patient subsequently detected 
unexpectedly with MRSA. Third, hospital staff who care for MRSA patients are 
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screened for MRSA and treated with  antibiotics and mupirocin nasal ointment if 
found positive (Boyce et al.  2005 ). 2 
 Nationally, this search and destroy  policy has proved highly successful and effec-
tive at maintaining a low prevalence of  MRSA  in Dutch hospitals (van der Zee et al. 
 2013 ). However, MRSA screening and treatment of health care staff can seriously 
affect their lives because they cannot return to work unless testing conﬁ rms MRSA- 
negative status. Fortunately, MRSA colonization ( antibiotic-resistant strain of bac-
teria that lives on skin) is usually temporary, but when persistent, eradication 
requires longer-term efforts. Although untreatable colonization is rare, it can neces-
sitate job change (Boyce et al.  2005 ). 
6.5.2  Case Description 
 A Dutch medical  student has the potentially more virulent Panton-Valentine leukoci-
din (PVL) form of MRSA colonization yet shows no signs or symptoms of infection. 
More than a year ago, a routine MRSA screening of health care personnel providing 
care for MRSA-positive patients detected the colonization. Since then, the student 
has been treated intensively but unsuccessfully in an attempt to decolonize her. 
During this decolonization period, the medical student was barred from performing 
patient-related interventions, temporarily interrupting her medical residency. After 
initial treatment with mupirocin nasal ointment and  antibiotics proved ineffective, a 
more stringent hygiene regime was added that included hand, nose, hair, and body 
scrubbing with disinfecting soap. Additional precautions included simultaneous 
treatment of household members and disinfection of the family home. Despite these 
efforts, her MRSA status has remained positive.  WIP  guideline s bar  any  health  care 
worker diagnosed with MRSA from performing patient-related interventions. Unable 
to complete the residency requirement of at least 1 year of patient care, the medical 
 student was advised to pursue a career in another profession. 
 Refusing to accept this verdict, she united with other similarly excluded medical 
students to launch a protest that gained media attention. In a press interview, she 
acknowledged that potential iatrogenic spreading of MRSA could risk institutional 
or community safety. However, she questioned the seriousness of this risk and 
argued that the protesting students were being unfairly targeted. She pointed out that 
medical staff are not routinely screened for MRSA unless they have cared for a 
MRSA-positive patient or have worked in a country with high MRSA prevalence. 
Because MRSA can be acquired in the community, potentially many undiagnosed 
MRSA-colonized medical staff  or  residents currently work in hospitals. She also 
pointed out that other European countries, despite a higher MRSA prevalence, allow 
MRSA carriers to work in health care settings. Despite being persistently MRSA 
positive, these professionals can safely work in medical specialties that do  not 
involve direct patient contact. 
2
 An English version of the WIP guidelines is available at  http://www.wip.nl 
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 As a result of this press coverage, the public has pressured  the WIP to reconsider its 
guidelines. Because iatrogenic spreading of disease has public health implications, you, 
as a public health  profession al, have been asked to serve on a WIP committee charged 
with considering whether the guidelines need to be changed to address these and future 
cases.  The chair of the committee wants to discuss the following questions. 
6.5.3  Discussion Questions 
 1.  Who are the main stakeholders in this case, and what are their primary interests? 
 2.  What is the ethical rationale for allowing or not allowing medical students who 
are MRSA carriers to continue their medical education? 
 3.  What would be your ethical justiﬁ cation for either recommending or not recom-
mending universal screening for all medical students and doctors? 
 4.  How would it change your recommendation if
 (a)  The MRSA of this student was not PVL positive? 
 (b)  The overall prevalence of MRSA in the Netherlands was high or rapidly 
increasing? 
 (c)  There was little or no evidence that excluding colonized health care workers 
decreases risks to patients? 
 (d)  The students agreed to pursue medical specialties that do not involve patient care? 
 5.  Although the European Union (EU) is increasingly standardizing its AMR  pol-
icy , some EU countries have less stringent regulations than others. Would it be 
ethical to advise the medical students in question to ﬁ nish their education in a 
European country with a less stringent MRSA policy? 
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